vendor research (Huntress, Nov 13, 2026); no malicious activity from the sessions observed so far
Hunt: thousands of fake ScreenConnect guest sessions named after crypto exchanges (KUCOIN-SRV, LAPTOP-BINANCE) on 118 self-hosted servers, possible bait for CVE-2026-84869
IOCs: 74.208.158[.]106 (IONOS, 97.8% of connections); 197.47.160[.]252 (first three sessions, Nov 3); related host 87.106.111[.]220; SSH host key SHA256:kt6iiIS3kcQ3NsUSVfk7gJoGMSSUqMdXqsmjb+/cSHg; claimed guest version 25.3.4.9288; thumbnail SHA-256s in the Huntress post.
Server database: new guest sessions with ClientType 1 and an empty guest public key; names like <EXCHANGE>-<ROLE>; empty company/site fields. Preserve App_Data\Session.db and its WAL before deleting anything.
Technician side: ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe spawning cmd, powershell, wscript or msiexec on a file under Documents\*\Temp\ is the shape of CVE-2026-84869 exploitation; check Temp and Startup folders on any unpatched client that joined.
Fix: update technician clients to 26.6.5 or later (or remove TransferFiles permission per ConnectWise), keep Access installer links private, rebuild leaked installers, and bar technicians from joining sessions they can't tie to a customer.