---
title: Hunt: thousands of fake ScreenConnect guest sessions named after crypto exchanges (KUCOIN-SRV, LAPTOP-BINANCE) on 118 self-hosted servers, possible bait for CVE-2026-84869 | ctxsec
url: https://ctxsec.com/items/hunt-huntress-crypto-exchange-named-fake-screenconnect-guest-sessions-118-servers
description: "Huntress found unauthorized Access guest sessions enrolled on at least 118 self-hosted ScreenConnect servers belonging to 109 organizations between Nov 3 and Nov 13 (the post cites both 2,223 and 2,408 sessions), with over 1,000 distinct exchange-plus-role names and trading-desktop thumbnails. They come from a scripted emulator impersonating a Windows client, mostly from one IONOS IP, and are kept online by an operator that revisits servers every 151 seconds. Enrollment only needs the relay address embedded in a server's guest installer, which ScreenConnect serves without authentication. Huntress has seen no files, commands or messages pushed from the sessions, but its leading hypothesis is that they're bait for technicians running clients vulnerable to CVE-2026-84869, which lets a malicious guest make a technician's client run a file. It found no overlap with SCKit indicators and doubts the sandbox-noise explanation."
status: "vendor research (Huntress, Nov 13, 2026); no malicious activity from the sessions observed so far"
published: 2026-11-14
---

> Huntress found unauthorized Access guest sessions enrolled on at least 118 self-hosted ScreenConnect servers belonging to 109 organizations between Nov 3 and Nov 13 (the post cites both 2,223 and 2,408 sessions), with over 1,000 distinct exchange-plus-role names and trading-desktop thumbnails. They come from a scripted emulator impersonating a Windows client, mostly from one IONOS IP, and are kept online by an operator that revisits servers every 151 seconds. Enrollment only needs the relay address embedded in a server's guest installer, which ScreenConnect serves without authentication. Huntress has seen no files, commands or messages pushed from the sessions, but its leading hypothesis is that they're bait for technicians running clients vulnerable to CVE-2026-84869, which lets a malicious guest make a technician's client run a file. It found no overlap with SCKit indicators and doubts the sandbox-noise explanation.

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vendor research (Huntress, Nov 13, 2026); no malicious activity from the sessions observed so far

2026-11-14 7:40 AM ET

### Hunt: thousands of fake ScreenConnect guest sessions named after crypto exchanges (KUCOIN-SRV, LAPTOP-BINANCE) on 118 self-hosted servers, possible bait for CVE-2026-84869

- **IOCs:** 74.208.158[.]106 (IONOS, 97.8% of connections); 197.47.160[.]252 (first three sessions, Nov 3); related host 87.106.111[.]220; SSH host key SHA256:kt6iiIS3kcQ3NsUSVfk7gJoGMSSUqMdXqsmjb+/cSHg; claimed guest version 25.3.4.9288; thumbnail SHA-256s in the Huntress post.
- **Server database:** new guest sessions with ClientType 1 and an empty guest public key; names like <EXCHANGE>-<ROLE>; empty company/site fields. Preserve `App_Data\Session.db` and its WAL before deleting anything.
- **Technician side:** ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe spawning cmd, powershell, wscript or msiexec on a file under `Documents\*\Temp\` is the shape of CVE-2026-84869 exploitation; check Temp and Startup folders on any unpatched client that joined.
- **Fix:** update technician clients to 26.6.5 or later (or remove TransferFiles permission per ConnectWise), keep Access installer links private, rebuild leaked installers, and bar technicians from joining sessions they can't tie to a customer.

Sources: [Huntress: Attackers use Crypto Exchange Names to Disguise Unauthorized Sessions on 100+ ScreenConnect Servers (Nov 13, 2026)](https://www.huntress.com/blog/fake-crypto-exchange-sessions-screenconnect)
