---
title: Someone consented to an unknown Entra agent blueprint (BluePhishing): find it, cut its access, and check what its agent identities did | ctxsec
url: https://ctxsec.com/playbooks/malicious-agent-blueprint-consent-response
---

[← Playbooks](/playbooks)

# Someone consented to an unknown Entra agent blueprint (BluePhishing): find it, cut its access, and check what its agent identities did

For Microsoft Entra tenants where a user or admin granted consent to a third-party agent blueprint you don't recognise. Built from Proofpoint's BluePhishing research (Nov 2026). The attacker holds the blueprint's secret in their own tenant, so removing the consent and its principals is what cuts access.

For: Identity / Entra admins, SOC, Cloud security

[1. Find the blueprint and its children](#s1)[2. Cut access](#s2)[3. Scope what the identities did](#s3)[4. Close the gap](#s4)

1.

Step 1 of 4

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### Find the blueprint and its children

The blueprint's application ID is the same in every tenant, which makes it easy to pivot on.

   - In audit logs, find the consent event and the 'Add service principal' for the blueprint principal; note its app ID and who consented
   - List agent identities created from that blueprint (agentIdentityBlueprintId) and their sponsors
   - Record the permissions in the consent grant: for admin consent, assume every listed application permission was usable tenant-wide

2.

Step 2 of 4

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### Cut access

Revoking only delegated grants isn't enough: the blueprint principal can create new agent identities.

   - Disable, then delete, the agent identities and the blueprint principal (keep exports as evidence)
   - Remove the consent grants and app role assignments tied to the blueprint
   - Block the blueprint's app ID from being consented again and tell other tenants you manage to search for it

3.

Step 3 of 4

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### Scope what the identities did

Agent activity looks autonomous by design, so check data access rather than sign-in prompts.

   - Pull sign-in logs for the agent identities (service principal sign-ins) and Graph activity logs for their object IDs since the consent time
   - Look for directory enumeration (users, groups), mail/files access, new app registrations, credentials added to other apps, and role assignments
   - Check the sponsor user's account for compromise; the sponsor ID was required to create the identities

4.

Step 4 of 4

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### Close the gap

Prevent the next consent.

   - Restrict user consent to verified publishers and low-risk permissions, or require admin consent; use permission classifications
   - Decide whether regular users may create agent blueprints (Proofpoint cites MC1506733 making this default from November 2026)
   - Alert on new agent blueprint principals from other tenants and on agent identity creation

Original content by ctxsec. Printable checklist: use your browser's print view.
