---
title: A caller posing as IT got an employee through an MFA relay: find the rogue MFA device, kill the sessions, scope the M365 data theft, and prepare for internal extortion messages | ctxsec
url: https://ctxsec.com/playbooks/help-desk-vishing-rogue-mfa-device-m365-exfiltration-response
---

[← Playbooks](/playbooks)

# A caller posing as IT got an employee through an MFA relay: find the rogue MFA device, kill the sessions, scope the M365 data theft, and prepare for internal extortion messages

For Microsoft 365 / Entra and Okta/Duo shops hit by Com-style vishing (ShinyHunters, Vortex and Cinder clusters per Unit 42, Nov 2026). Speed matters: these crews enroll their own MFA device within minutes and script exfiltration of mail, OneDrive and SharePoint.

For: SOC / incident response, Identity team, Help desk, Legal & comms

[1. Contain the identity](#s1)[2. Find the other victims](#s2)[3. Scope the data theft](#s3)[4. Prepare for extortion](#s4)[5. Close the gaps](#s5)

1.

Step 1 of 5

__

### Contain the identity

Assume the attacker holds a valid session and a registered MFA method.

   - Revoke all sessions and refresh tokens for the user (Entra: revoke sessions; Okta: clear sessions); reset the password
   - List authentication methods and delete any registered in the attack window, especially unfamiliar phones (e.g. 'Pixel 10a')
   - Invalidate persistent 'remember me' tokens (Duo, Okta, Entra), since Cinder replayed them from proxies

2.

Step 2 of 5

__

### Find the other victims

Crews call many staff in one campaign.

   - Search sign-in logs for the same AiTM proxy IPs, lookalike SSO domains in proxy/DNS logs, and new MFA registrations within ~10 minutes of a sign-in
   - Ask the help desk and switchboard for reports of 'IT support' calls in the last 14 days
   - Block the lookalike domains and the attacker IPs from vendor reporting

3.

Step 3 of 5

__

### Scope the data theft

Exfiltration is usually scripted through Microsoft Graph.

   - Query unified audit logs for FileDownloaded/FileSyncDownloaded spikes and MailItemsAccessed by the account
   - Filter Graph activity by user agents such as python-requests, kiota-dotnet and Microsoft.Graph.Client
   - Check endpoints for sideloaded browser extensions (Developer Mode on, extensions named like 'Google Chrome')

4.

Step 4 of 5

__

### Prepare for extortion

These groups message staff directly over Teams and email.

   - Warn employees that internal Teams or email messages claiming data theft may arrive from a compromised account; tell them not to engage and where to report
   - Engage legal on notification duties and law enforcement; don't negotiate through the attacker's Tor site without counsel
   - Preserve logs before retention windows lapse

5.

Step 5 of 5

__

### Close the gaps

Make the next call fail.

   - Require phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) to register new MFA methods, and alert on every new registration
   - Add callback verification and a no-remote-tool rule to help-desk scripts, and teach staff that IT will never send them to a new SSO domain by phone
   - Block extension sideloading and Developer Mode by browser policy

Original content by ctxsec. Printable checklist: use your browser's print view.
