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A caller posing as IT got an employee through an MFA relay: find the rogue MFA device, kill the sessions, scope the M365 data theft, and prepare for internal extortion messages

For Microsoft 365 / Entra and Okta/Duo shops hit by Com-style vishing (ShinyHunters, Vortex and Cinder clusters per Unit 42, Nov 2026). Speed matters: these crews enroll their own MFA device within minutes and script exfiltration of mail, OneDrive and SharePoint.

For: SOC / incident response, Identity team, Help desk, Legal & comms

1. Contain the identity2. Find the other victims3. Scope the data theft4. Prepare for extortion5. Close the gaps
  1. Step 1 of 5

    Contain the identity

    Assume the attacker holds a valid session and a registered MFA method.

    • Revoke all sessions and refresh tokens for the user (Entra: revoke sessions; Okta: clear sessions); reset the password
    • List authentication methods and delete any registered in the attack window, especially unfamiliar phones (e.g. 'Pixel 10a')
    • Invalidate persistent 'remember me' tokens (Duo, Okta, Entra), since Cinder replayed them from proxies
  2. Step 2 of 5

    Find the other victims

    Crews call many staff in one campaign.

    • Search sign-in logs for the same AiTM proxy IPs, lookalike SSO domains in proxy/DNS logs, and new MFA registrations within ~10 minutes of a sign-in
    • Ask the help desk and switchboard for reports of 'IT support' calls in the last 14 days
    • Block the lookalike domains and the attacker IPs from vendor reporting
  3. Step 3 of 5

    Scope the data theft

    Exfiltration is usually scripted through Microsoft Graph.

    • Query unified audit logs for FileDownloaded/FileSyncDownloaded spikes and MailItemsAccessed by the account
    • Filter Graph activity by user agents such as python-requests, kiota-dotnet and Microsoft.Graph.Client
    • Check endpoints for sideloaded browser extensions (Developer Mode on, extensions named like 'Google Chrome')
  4. Step 4 of 5

    Prepare for extortion

    These groups message staff directly over Teams and email.

    • Warn employees that internal Teams or email messages claiming data theft may arrive from a compromised account; tell them not to engage and where to report
    • Engage legal on notification duties and law enforcement; don't negotiate through the attacker's Tor site without counsel
    • Preserve logs before retention windows lapse
  5. Step 5 of 5

    Close the gaps

    Make the next call fail.

    • Require phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) to register new MFA methods, and alert on every new registration
    • Add callback verification and a no-remote-tool rule to help-desk scripts, and teach staff that IT will never send them to a new SSO domain by phone
    • Block extension sideloading and Developer Mode by browser policy

Original content by ctxsec. Printable checklist: use your browser's print view.