A caller posing as IT got an employee through an MFA relay: find the rogue MFA device, kill the sessions, scope the M365 data theft, and prepare for internal extortion messages
For Microsoft 365 / Entra and Okta/Duo shops hit by Com-style vishing (ShinyHunters, Vortex and Cinder clusters per Unit 42, Nov 2026). Speed matters: these crews enroll their own MFA device within minutes and script exfiltration of mail, OneDrive and SharePoint.
1. Contain the identity2. Find the other victims3. Scope the data theft4. Prepare for extortion5. Close the gaps
Contain the identity
Assume the attacker holds a valid session and a registered MFA method.
- Revoke all sessions and refresh tokens for the user (Entra: revoke sessions; Okta: clear sessions); reset the password
- List authentication methods and delete any registered in the attack window, especially unfamiliar phones (e.g. 'Pixel 10a')
- Invalidate persistent 'remember me' tokens (Duo, Okta, Entra), since Cinder replayed them from proxies
Find the other victims
Crews call many staff in one campaign.
- Search sign-in logs for the same AiTM proxy IPs, lookalike SSO domains in proxy/DNS logs, and new MFA registrations within ~10 minutes of a sign-in
- Ask the help desk and switchboard for reports of 'IT support' calls in the last 14 days
- Block the lookalike domains and the attacker IPs from vendor reporting
Scope the data theft
Exfiltration is usually scripted through Microsoft Graph.
- Query unified audit logs for FileDownloaded/FileSyncDownloaded spikes and MailItemsAccessed by the account
- Filter Graph activity by user agents such as python-requests, kiota-dotnet and Microsoft.Graph.Client
- Check endpoints for sideloaded browser extensions (Developer Mode on, extensions named like 'Google Chrome')
Prepare for extortion
These groups message staff directly over Teams and email.
- Warn employees that internal Teams or email messages claiming data theft may arrive from a compromised account; tell them not to engage and where to report
- Engage legal on notification duties and law enforcement; don't negotiate through the attacker's Tor site without counsel
- Preserve logs before retention windows lapse
Close the gaps
Make the next call fail.
- Require phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) to register new MFA methods, and alert on every new registration
- Add callback verification and a no-remote-tool rule to help-desk scripts, and teach staff that IT will never send them to a new SSO domain by phone
- Block extension sideloading and Developer Mode by browser policy