• Confirmed by WorkOS: unauthorized access found Oct 30 to an internal sales application; data involved covers CRM contact details (names, emails, phones, titles, companies), account and relationship history, summaries and excerpts of sales calls, support threads and customer Slack conversations, and product-usage and directory-health metadata. External access to the app is disabled, an outside DFIR firm is engaged, and affected customers will be contacted directly.
• Not affected, per WorkOS: no evidence that WorkOS application data or production services were accessed.
• Tooling: the bulletin says an AI-assisted offensive security framework automated recon and exploitation. Grinich said on X that requests carried user agents artex-enrich/1.0 and norma/0.4, "likely attributable to ARTEX" based on Wiz reporting and forks of the open-source tool. He also said tokens pasted into support messages are revoked immediately.

What to do if you're a WorkOS customer: expect convincing phishing that quotes real sales or support conversations, and verify any unexpected request out of band; rotate any secret that was ever pasted into a WorkOS support or shared Slack thread; and search your own web and API logs for the two user-agent strings above. More broadly, give sales and support tools that can read customer Slack or ticket history the same access review as production.