---
title: Tip: if your MCP or API gateway injects upstream credentials, strip every client-supplied auth header before forwarding | ctxsec
url: https://ctxsec.com/items/tip-mcp-gateways-strip-client-supplied-auth-headers-before-upstream-contextforge
description: "ContextForge's bug was a client header that was passed through and renamed to Authorization, overriding the credential the gateway was supposed to own. The same pattern can appear in any proxy that adds credentials on the client's behalf."
status: "guidance based on IBM's ContextForge CVE-2026-110279 bulletin"
published: 2026-11-15
---

> ContextForge's bug was a client header that was passed through and renamed to Authorization, overriding the credential the gateway was supposed to own. The same pattern can appear in any proxy that adds credentials on the client's behalf.

[← Tips & Guides](/tips) · [markdown](/items/tip-mcp-gateways-strip-client-supplied-auth-headers-before-upstream-contextforge.md)

guidance based on IBM's ContextForge CVE-2026-110279 bulletin

2026-11-15 7:38 PM ET

### Tip: if your MCP or API gateway injects upstream credentials, strip every client-supplied auth header before forwarding

- **Default deny:** at the edge, remove `Authorization`, `Proxy-Authorization`, `X-Upstream-*` and any custom auth headers from client requests unless a route explicitly needs them.
- **Set, don't merge:** have the gateway set the upstream credential last, overwriting anything already present.
- **Test it:** send a request with a bogus upstream auth header and confirm upstream logs show the gateway's identity, not yours.

Sources: [IBM security bulletin: ContextForge MCP Gateway CVE-2026-110279 (Nov 12, 2026)](https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7296490)
