---
title: Stormshield: the Slaiclind campaign uses EtherHiding on Polygon plus ClickFix, then a Deno loader and process ghosting | ctxsec
url: https://ctxsec.com/items/stormshield-slaiclind-clickfix-etherhiding-oct-19
description: "Stormshield's Oct 19 CTI post describes a campaign it calls Slaiclind, seen on compromised websites since the end of September, that combines EtherHiding (a Polygon smart contract used as a C2 lookup) with a fake-Cloudflare ClickFix lure. After the victim runs the suggested command, the chain uses winget to install the Deno runtime, runs a JavaScript loader, and Stormshield describes a process-ghosting step before the final payload. The contract address given is 0xb29927B7D854b232D5E58CFc201866376E68C676. Stormshield says the injected script first checks that the page is WordPress and that the admin bar is not shown, to reduce the chance a site administrator will notice it."
status: "official (Stormshield CTI article, Oct 19, 2026); active campaign since late September"
published: 2026-10-19
---

> Stormshield's Oct 19 CTI post describes a campaign it calls Slaiclind, seen on compromised websites since the end of September, that combines EtherHiding (a Polygon smart contract used as a C2 lookup) with a fake-Cloudflare ClickFix lure. After the victim runs the suggested command, the chain uses winget to install the Deno runtime, runs a JavaScript loader, and Stormshield describes a process-ghosting step before the final payload. The contract address given is 0xb29927B7D854b232D5E58CFc201866376E68C676. Stormshield says the injected script first checks that the page is WordPress and that the admin bar is not shown, to reduce the chance a site administrator will notice it.

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official (Stormshield CTI article, Oct 19, 2026); active campaign since late September

2026-10-19 · published here

2026-11-19 1:16 PM ET

### Stormshield: the Slaiclind campaign uses EtherHiding on Polygon plus ClickFix, then a Deno loader and process ghosting

- **EtherHiding lookup:** the embedded script calls eth_call against the Polygon contract via public RPC endpoints to retrieve the next-stage URL, so the C2 location is not hard-coded as a single domain in the first page script.
- **IOCs:** Stormshield publishes a table of C2 domains (including checkmybtrobot[.]cc, from which the Deno loader retrieves a script), one C2 IP (78.40.198[.]82) and two MD5 hashes. Use the original article for the full list.
- **Do not treat this as a named-threat-actor attribution:** Stormshield analyzes the campaign's techniques and infrastructure; it does not identify the operator in the post we read.

Sources: [Stormshield CTI: Slaiclind — Analyzing a Campaign Combining ClickFix and EtherHiding (Oct 19, 2026)](https://www.stormshield.com/news/cti-payload-slaiclind-campaign/)
