---
title: NebuSec chained a malicious web page in Meta Muse's PDF export into silent theft of chats and memories, then a kernel escape that reached the user VM's credential store; researchers say all of it is patched | ctxsec
url: https://ctxsec.com/items/nebusec-meta-muse-malicious-page-pdf-export-chromium-rce-sentinel-bypass-silent-chat-memory-exfil-kernel-escape-credential-store
description: "Muse's agent uses Chromium to export pages as PDFs, and that process ran with its sandbox disabled, so one renderer bug gave the researchers shell commands in the agent's container when a user asked Muse to save an attacker's page. They then studied Sentinel, Muse's outbound-traffic gate: body-less GET/HEAD requests count as reads that can leave without a prompt under the default setting, subject to entropy and per-domain volume budgets, and they shaped exfiltration to fit those rules, sending conversation history and stored memories out and altering both. A Linux kernel exploit then gave root in the user's VM, exposing persistent storage, Secure Credential Storage and Sentinel itself. They did not escape the hypervisor or reach other users."
status: "research (NebuSec write-ups, Nov 20, 2026); fixes per the researchers, Meta has not commented publicly"
published: 2026-11-20
---

> Muse's agent uses Chromium to export pages as PDFs, and that process ran with its sandbox disabled, so one renderer bug gave the researchers shell commands in the agent's container when a user asked Muse to save an attacker's page. They then studied Sentinel, Muse's outbound-traffic gate: body-less GET/HEAD requests count as reads that can leave without a prompt under the default setting, subject to entropy and per-domain volume budgets, and they shaped exfiltration to fit those rules, sending conversation history and stored memories out and altering both. A Linux kernel exploit then gave root in the user's VM, exposing persistent storage, Secure Credential Storage and Sentinel itself. They did not escape the hypervisor or reach other users.

[← Context & Harness Attacks](/context) · [markdown](/items/nebusec-meta-muse-malicious-page-pdf-export-chromium-rce-sentinel-bypass-silent-chat-memory-exfil-kernel-escape-credential-store.md)

research (NebuSec write-ups, Nov 20, 2026); fixes per the researchers, Meta has not commented publicly

2026-11-20 · published here

2026-11-21 7:49 AM ET

### NebuSec chained a malicious web page in Meta Muse's PDF export into silent theft of chats and memories, then a kernel escape that reached the user VM's credential store; researchers say all of it is patched

- **For agent builders:** egress approval that trusts 'reads' can be drained through GETs; treat query strings and paths as data. Keep browser sandboxes on even in helper tasks like PDF export, and don't let the agent's container share a kernel with your secrets.

Sources: [NebuSec: Hacking Muse: Stealing Private Chats Through Browser Use (Nov 20, 2026)](https://nebusec.ai/research/meta-muse-credential-exposure/) · [NebuSec: Inside Meta Muse: Browser, Sentinel and the Shared-Kernel Boundary (Nov 20, 2026)](https://nebusec.ai/research/inside-meta-muse/)
