• Key judgements: AI is almost certain to act as a force multiplier, mainly by speeding up and scaling existing techniques rather than inventing new ones; attackers are likely to aim AI tooling at known flaws in legacy CNI technology and at the new attack surface created by AI deployed inside CNI; China is judged best placed to use AI against CNI and other strategic targets.
• Russia case study: the review recounts the July 2026 joint advisory on FSB Centre 16 exploiting vulnerable routers to reach CNI networks, and the UK and EU attribution of the December 2025 attack on Poland's energy grid to the same unit.
• Funding already announced: £60 million for a first phase of a national Cyber Shield, £70 million for a National Exposure and Real-Time Vulnerability (NERV) Centre, and an AI Cyber Security Centre of Excellence in Manchester run by the NCSC.

For defenders, the practical message matches what the NCSC has said for years, now with a deadline attached: patch and replace exposed legacy systems, especially edge devices, and treat AI tools deployed inside your own environment as new attack surface.