---
title: LUKSO: a backend flaw in its email-based recovery service let an attacker take over about 300 Universal Profiles and steal about 1.4M LYX | ctxsec
url: https://ctxsec.com/items/lukso-email-recovery-backend-incident-300-profiles-1-4m-lyx-nov-17-18
description: "LUKSO's post-mortem says that overnight from November 17 to 18 an attacker exploited a security hole in the backend of its email-based recovery service, took control of the service's recovery profiles, and added their own controller key to about 300 Universal Profiles. About 1.4 million LYX was taken from those profiles, bridged to Ethereum and swapped to about 50 ETH. LUKSO says the blockchain, Universal Profile contracts and other recovery methods were not affected, no private keys or recovery phrases were leaked, and the email recovery service has been switched off and is being decommissioned."
status: "official (LUKSO post-mortem on Medium)"
published: 2026-11-18
---

> LUKSO's post-mortem says that overnight from November 17 to 18 an attacker exploited a security hole in the backend of its email-based recovery service, took control of the service's recovery profiles, and added their own controller key to about 300 Universal Profiles. About 1.4 million LYX was taken from those profiles, bridged to Ethereum and swapped to about 50 ETH. LUKSO says the blockchain, Universal Profile contracts and other recovery methods were not affected, no private keys or recovery phrases were leaked, and the email recovery service has been switched off and is being decommissioned.

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official (LUKSO post-mortem on Medium)

2026-11-18 · published here

2026-11-19 12:44 PM ET

### LUKSO: a backend flaw in its email-based recovery service let an attacker take over about 300 Universal Profiles and steal about 1.4M LYX

- **Affected users:** check [incident-check.lukso.tools](https://incident-check.lukso.tools/), then remove the attacker's controller `0xa2f8Fd85366d1B4A3B13C33A48CD959F6D1Ba3a7` (remove it even if it does not appear in the list) and remove the "recovery-UP" controller. LUKSO says it is working on reimbursement and will post details later.
- **Not affected:** profiles that did not use email-based recovery. LUKSO published an Ethereum address it says now holds the swapped ETH: `0x4d2BFb7Ca38Cb3Ea136845a9dd0FBEACe2Cd365C`.
- **Support:** LUKSO says it will never ask for a recovery phrase.

Sources: [LUKSO: Post Mortem: Security incident in the email-based recovery system](https://medium.com/@lukso/post-mortem-security-incident-in-the-email-based-recovery-system-029f6f241e2b) · [LUKSO on X: steps for affected users](https://x.com/LUKSO_io/status/2122954621253464215)
