Hunt: Falcon (XG), a browser-only C2 injected into government Roundcube and web apps, a fake 'PDF Viewer' extension and the OneDrive-controlled Antino implant
- C2:
fonts.tarotfree101[.]top,fonts.chrorne[.]com,robot.avbliud[.]com; payload hostsmicrosoft-flash[.]com(/download/Adobe_installer.exe),wps-cn[.]com. URL pattern/config/<ATTACK_ID>with/hta,/html,/wscriptvariants. - Web apps: new
<script>tags in Roundcube or portal headers loading external resources such asconfig_r5lfmqe3; responses that are a long integer array with a small XOR decoder;Hm_lvt_cookies/local storage on internal sites with no Baidu Analytics; long-lived WebSockets sending{"heartbeat":"1"}. - Browser: extension ID
mbidcmlcbgbphpoacojjbmfpohcimjji('PDF Viewer', version 2026.5.13.1, developer-mode sideload, 40 permissions,<all_urls>); storage keyclipboard_replacer_rules; downloads cancelled and re-fetched from another host under the same name. - Antino: SHA-256
0c39264337a1186b2e765e24073399cbdcba118306614eb411e315887af578bd(flashcenter_pp_ax_install_en.exe); copies to%LOCALAPPDATA%\Windows GatherOSStateKit\tmp<8>.exe; persistence viasdiagnhost.exerunning%TEMP%\SDIAG_<GUID>\result\result.ps1to add a Run key; OneDrive pathsantino/heartbeat/andantino/antino_upload/via an external tenant. - Prevent: block developer-mode extensions by policy, allowlist extensions, and add file-integrity monitoring to webmail templates.
Sources: Unit 42: The XG Files: Falcon C2 Flying Under The (Browser) Radar (Nov 11, 2026) · Unit 42 on X (Nov 13, 2026)