---
title: Hunt: 49 fake 'PDF Reader' pages draw a browser-in-the-browser window and auto-download ScreenConnect or FleetDeck installers tied to attacker tenants | ctxsec
url: https://ctxsec.com/items/hunt-unit42-fake-pdf-reader-browser-in-the-browser-screenconnect-fleetdeck-rmm-installers-telegram-alerts
description: "Unit 42 found 49 pages from November 1-14, all built from one template, showing a fake browser window with a spoofed PDF-vendor download address. On load they silently download a legitimate remote-management installer (17 ScreenConnect cloud instances, one FleetDeck agent, one look-alike ScreenConnect host) and tell the victim to run it. Each visit is reported to the operator through a Telegram bot after an ipapi.co lookup. Scanners and cloud IPs get a fake maintenance page. There are two hosting clusters: 25 pages on five workers.dev accounts, and 24 on attacker domains and third-party sites. They share the kit, but Unit 42 has not proven a single operator."
status: "official (Unit 42 Timely Threat Intel, Nov 20, 2026)"
published: 2026-11-20
---

> Unit 42 found 49 pages from November 1-14, all built from one template, showing a fake browser window with a spoofed PDF-vendor download address. On load they silently download a legitimate remote-management installer (17 ScreenConnect cloud instances, one FleetDeck agent, one look-alike ScreenConnect host) and tell the victim to run it. Each visit is reported to the operator through a Telegram bot after an ipapi.co lookup. Scanners and cloud IPs get a fake maintenance page. There are two hosting clusters: 25 pages on five workers.dev accounts, and 24 on attacker domains and third-party sites. They share the kit, but Unit 42 has not proven a single operator.

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official (Unit 42 Timely Threat Intel, Nov 20, 2026)

2026-11-20 7:44 PM ET

### Hunt: 49 fake 'PDF Reader' pages draw a browser-in-the-browser window and auto-download ScreenConnect or FleetDeck installers tied to attacker tenants

- **Hunt:** ScreenConnect.ClientSetup downloads with e=Access&y=Guest from *.screenconnect.com tenants your org doesn't own; FleetDeck agent installs (fleetdeck_agent_svc.exe); browser-side requests to ipapi.co/json followed by POSTs to api.telegram.org.
- **Allowlist RMM tenants:** inventory the ScreenConnect/FleetDeck instances you use and alert on others. Block tenant URLs, not the vendor domains.
- **Example IOCs:** files-reader-view[.]com, darksupport[.]shop, docprivates[.]shop, fitarno[.]cloud, app.cosscon[.]site. The full list is in the Unit 42 file.

Sources: [Unit 42 Timely Threat Intel: Fake PDF Reader Download Uses Browser-in-the-Browser Window to Deliver Packages Abusing RMM Software (Nov 20, 2026)](https://github.com/PaloAltoNetworks/Unit42-timely-threat-intel/blob/main/2026-11-20-RRM-packages-disguised-as-PDF-reader-software.txt)
