Hunt: GTPDoor v3 (GTP-U) and SCTPE hashes, plus the signalling patterns Enea used to spot SilentAir inside operators
- MD5:
35f0d4d0c5519a2957338e448fce53bc(GTPDoor v3),da35d98c9a22e8ede93595d21fe7e63e(SCTPE, the SS7/Diameter injection trojan CrowdStrike calls SIGweaver) - Host: GTPDoor v3 uses libpcap instead of raw sockets, so look for unexpected pcap handles on GGSN/PGW and other IPX-facing Linux nodes rather than relying on netstat/lsof; also look for modified SGSNemu and EchoBackdoor, timestomping and file deletion.
- GTP: GTP-C Echo Requests carrying payloads, and GTP-U tunnels to other operators that set up and tear down on their own (Enea found half lasted under 21 minutes).
- SS7/Diameter: outbound UpdateLocation/ULR, SRI-SM, SendAuthenticationInfo or AIR bursts from your own GTs toward foreign subscribers (especially Taiwan); the same node answering a transaction twice, or uninitiated transactions to your GTs being ignored, aborted or acknowledged inconsistently.
- SMS: silent SMS bursts around midnight UTC+8, submitted via a third operator's SMSC and carrying motivational spam text such as "Stay healthy, stay happy, always shine!"
- Enea's advice: run GTP-C and GTP-U firewalls that share data with SS7/Diameter firewalls, and treat the whole IPX as untrusted.
Sources: Enea: The Enemy Within (IOC table and SilentAir tactics)