[ctx]ctxseccontext security: attacks on the harness and context layer of AI agents, plus exploited-now news, hunting and playbooks.

← Threat Hunting · markdown

vendor research (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Nov 3); PUA/monetization campaign, not classic credential-stealer; domains rotate — hunt the callback pattern

Hunt: fake game/crack Inno installers that install WorldProxyPool proxyware, CharityEngine/BOINC compute, or AW Manager utilities

  • Process: execution from %TEMP%\is-*.tmp\ of eld*.exe, set_*.exe, FirstFast[1].exe, SecondRunner[1].exe.
  • Network: outbound URLs containing d=inno with r=offer_execution or r=offer_execution_fail (domains rotate; examples in the blog include beliefdesk[.]xyz, companyharbor[.]xyz, signalpane[.]cfd, inkact[.]xyz, wishgrove[.]cfd).
  • Persistence: scheduled tasks WorldProxyPoolAgent, WorldProxyPoolWatchdog, WorldProxyPoolUpdater; path C:\Program Files\WorldProxyPool\sdk-agent.exe.
  • Inventory: unexpected WorldProxyPool, CharityEngine, BOINC or VirtualBox installs users did not choose.
  • Hashes (SHA-256 samples from Microsoft): 006510ce1da2b7410376f0788c19e55616eb4bcc30072d25b7d0871dc32aa11c, 21306fc5716f95e252388f920314b42f1c8bcc7df67cb4d39da30217b96f4044, ab2c2dd37fdcfe1e7620a57f98c80bd063258bea145adc0cc6a0f8b1e24c6a8f.

Sources: Microsoft Security Blog: Fake-download campaign uses trojanized installers to deliver monetization payloads (Nov 3)