Hunt: forged X-GPUStack-Real-IP headers, new wildcard admin API keys and YAML-created inference backends on GPUStack servers
- Requests: any inbound
X-GPUStack-Real-IPheader from outside your gateway, especially with the value127.0.0.1; admin API calls with no credentials that succeeded. - API keys: admin keys with scope
["*"]that nobody on the team created. The advisory notes they remain valid from any source IP after creation, so revoke and recreate them. - Backends: calls to
POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yamland any custom backend whose command or image you don't recognize; check worker hosts for outbound shells started by the backend process. - Secrets: rotate worker credentials and cloud or provider keys stored in GPUStack, which the bypass exposes.
- Shape at risk: GPUStack behind a same-host reverse proxy with
proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:..., where every remote request looks like loopback.
Sources: GPUStack advisory GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr: authentication bypass via trusted loopback source grants unauthenticated admin · CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (four entries added Nov 9)