EggStreme rebuilt after exposure: agent drops gRPC for raw TCP with wolfSSL mutual TLS, adds a passive mode and AD recon; behaviour stayed the same
- Hunt behaviour, not hashes: signed binaries sideloading DLLs from unusual paths; processes other than the expected Windows component reading
Alarm00.wav,appmain.sdb,expmain.sdb,systemZones.res,Feeds.tmpormsinfo32.dll. - Lateral movement: unexpected changes to Netlogon logon scripts and files copied over admin shares followed by new Run keys.
- Passive implants: look for unexpected listening ports on servers and workstations, since the passive variant waits for inbound connections.
- DFIR: always collect the sideloaded DLL together with its payload file; each payload carries its own key.
Sources: Bitdefender Business Insights: EggStreme Malware, Rebuilt Under Scrutiny (Nov 18, 2026)