Hunting Axis exploitation in Confluence: failed-looking SOAP POSTs, Java spawning bash and curl, and Pinggy/Cloudflare tunnel staging
- Web logs: unauthenticated POSTs to
/plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2. They returned HTTP 500 and still worked, so don't dismiss error responses. - Process tree: the Confluence Java process launching
bashorcurlas the confluence service account; hundreds of hex-encoded commands with labeled output delimiters and sequential task IDs. - Data access: MySQL logins with Confluence's own DB credentials soon after exploitation; reads under
/var/atlassian/application-data/confluence/attachments/v4/; Crowd API user/group queries; ImpacketGetNPUsers.py(AS-REP roasting) against domain controllers. - Cloud follow-on: service-account queries to data warehouses and Microsoft 365 sign-ins using legacy authentication from integration accounts.
- Confluence IOCs: 192.238.253[.]176, 5.133.47[.]243, 163.182.68[.]109, 104.13.106[.]166,
*.trycloudflare[.]com,wpefh-192-238-253-176.free.pinggy[.]net,webhook[.]site. - N-central IOCs (from N-able's Nov 13 update): 157.20.241[.]16, 139.99.69[.]109, 79.76.51[.]56.
Rapid7 notes the absence of these indicators does not prove an instance was untouched.