---
title: Hunt: coding agents run as background services that spawn nmap, smbclient or FTP clients (Darktrace Claude memory-store C2) | ctxsec
url: https://ctxsec.com/items/hunt-claude-code-launched-by-systemd-non-interactive-spawning-recon-smb-tools
description: "Darktrace's lab C2 ran Claude Code from a transient systemd unit in non-interactive mode, and the agent then did recon, password spraying and SMB downloads. Developers rarely run coding agents that way, so the process tree is the signal."
status: "hunting guidance based on Darktrace Signal Labs lab research (Nov 12, 2026); no in-the-wild IOCs"
published: 2026-11-14
---

> Darktrace's lab C2 ran Claude Code from a transient systemd unit in non-interactive mode, and the agent then did recon, password spraying and SMB downloads. Developers rarely run coding agents that way, so the process tree is the signal.

[← Threat Hunting](/hunting) · [markdown](/items/hunt-claude-code-launched-by-systemd-non-interactive-spawning-recon-smb-tools.md)

hunting guidance based on Darktrace Signal Labs lab research (Nov 12, 2026); no in-the-wild IOCs

2026-11-14 7:35 PM ET

### Hunt: coding agents run as background services that spawn nmap, smbclient or FTP clients (Darktrace Claude memory-store C2)

- **Parentage:** claude (or node running Claude Code) whose parent is systemd/a transient `systemd-run` unit, cron, or a shell script rather than a user terminal or IDE; also new transient units created by dash/sh.
- **Flags:** non-interactive runs (`-p`/`--print`) combined with `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, especially repeated on a timer.
- **Children:** agent processes spawning nmap, smbclient, ftp, ldap/kerberos tools, or `split` on large files; logins to the domain controller from a developer host.
- **Network:** large uploads to api.anthropic.com Files endpoints from hosts that normally only send prompts; Console audit for new memory stores or workspaces you didn't create.
- **If found:** revoke the Console API key, isolate the host and look for the initial access that stole it.

Sources: [Darktrace: Living off the AI: How Claude Memory Stores Enable Covert C2 Channels (Nov 12, 2026)](https://www.darktrace.com/blog/living-off-the-ai-shared-memories-as-a-covert-c2-channel) · [Help Net Security: Stolen Claude API keys can turn Claude Code into a remote-controlled implant (Nov 12, 2026)](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/11/12/stolen-claude-api-keys-remote-controlled-implant/)
