---
title: Hunt: Cairn-driven intrusions: MONAI Label datastore writes outside the datastore, a modified sitecustomize.py, and traffic from 142.4.98.145 / 142.4.107.34 | ctxsec
url: https://ctxsec.com/items/hunt-amazon-cairn-agents-monai-label-path-traversal-sitecustomize-reverse-shell-142-4-98-145-142-4-107-34
description: "Amazon published two IP addresses seen Sept 8-10, 2026 and described the agents' exploitation chain: path-traversal file write through MONAI Label's upload endpoint, a Python reverse shell dropped into sitecustomize.py, and a training API call to spawn a new Python process."
status: "hunting guide (based on Amazon Threat Intelligence, Nov 20, 2026, and MONAI Label GHSA-qc22-rmgc-vg94)"
published: 2026-11-20
---

> Amazon published two IP addresses seen Sept 8-10, 2026 and described the agents' exploitation chain: path-traversal file write through MONAI Label's upload endpoint, a Python reverse shell dropped into sitecustomize.py, and a training API call to spawn a new Python process.

[← Threat Hunting](/hunting) · [markdown](/items/hunt-amazon-cairn-agents-monai-label-path-traversal-sitecustomize-reverse-shell-142-4-98-145-142-4-107-34.md)

hunting guide (based on Amazon Threat Intelligence, Nov 20, 2026, and MONAI Label GHSA-qc22-rmgc-vg94)

2026-11-20 3:49 PM ET

### Hunt: Cairn-driven intrusions: MONAI Label datastore writes outside the datastore, a modified sitecustomize.py, and traffic from 142.4.98.145 / 142.4.107.34

- **Network:** search firewall, proxy and flow logs for 142[.]4.98.145 and 142[.]4.107.34 (records dated Sept 8-10, 2026).
- **Web logs:** on MONAI Label servers, look for `PUT /datastore/image` or `/datastore/label` requests whose `image` parameter contains `../` or absolute paths.
- **Files:** check every Python environment on those hosts for new or changed `sitecustomize.py`/`usercustomize.py` and unexpected `.pth` files.
- **Process:** Python processes started by the MONAI Label service that open outbound sockets or spawn shells.
- **Agent fingerprints:** long, tireless sequences of Redis replication/module abuse, SSRF probes and credential sprays from one source are typical of autonomous tooling.

Sources: [AWS Security Blog (CJ Moses): Chinese-nexus actor's Cairn AI agents found a zero-day on their own (Nov 20, 2026)](https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/chinese-nexus-actors-cairn-ai-agents-found-a-zero-day-on-their-own/) · [MONAI Label GHSA-qc22-rmgc-vg94: Path traversal in datastore upload endpoints allows arbitrary file write (critical, Nov 18, 2026)](https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAILabel/security/advisories/GHSA-qc22-rmgc-vg94)
