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HiddenLayer: 'decision' model Jev still falls for prompt injection; a fake ad got 91% of the checkout click

HiddenLayer tested Jev, TypeSafe AI's early-access model that returns typed choices and probabilities instead of text, to see if decision-style output resists manipulation. In a simulated store, a browser agent on jev-ultrafast was told to buy the cart and that page text is untrusted; a sponsored ad offering a "Confirm Price" button drew 91% of Jev's probability versus 9% for Place order. A Qwen-based look-alike HiddenLayer built for comparison went from 99.7% Place order to 79.9% for the ad. In a second test, an expanded TokenBreak spelling attack got many of 30 toxic prompts past Jev used as a toxicity filter. Caveats: HiddenLayer sells AI security products, and its posts do not state trial counts for the Jev checkout run. Takeaway: a typed decision is still model output; put a deterministic check between it and any action that moves money, data or access.

Sources: HiddenLayer insight (Oct 14) · HiddenLayer research write-up · The Register