---
title: eMudhra's full incident report: one HSM-migration script broke 8 ECDSA keys and forced revocation of 8 RSA intermediates too; G1 issuance stops by Nov 16 | ctxsec
url: https://ctxsec.com/items/emudhra-full-incident-report-8-rsa-g2b-g2c-intermediates-revoked-nov-7-g1-stop-nov-16
description: "eMudhra's full report says all 16 affected subordinate CA keys came from one key ceremony on Apr 30, 2025, where a custom Python script wrapped and re-imported keys to move them between HSM vendors. For the eight ECDSA P-384 keys (G3B/G3C) a bug truncated the private value, making them recoverable. The eight RSA-4096 keys (G2B/G2C) were intact, but their private key material passed through the memory of a Python process on the ceremony host, so eMudhra says it can't show compliance with its CPS and revoked them on Nov 7. The four RSA G2C TLS and code-signing issuers had been issuing end-entity certificates since May 2026; eMudhra says those subscribers have been migrated. All issuance from the remaining emSign Root CA - G1 hierarchy will stop before Nov 16 as eMudhra exits public TLS."
status: "official (eMudhra full incident report on Mozilla Bugzilla 2083449, Nov 10, 2026)"
published: 2026-11-11
---

> eMudhra's full report says all 16 affected subordinate CA keys came from one key ceremony on Apr 30, 2025, where a custom Python script wrapped and re-imported keys to move them between HSM vendors. For the eight ECDSA P-384 keys (G3B/G3C) a bug truncated the private value, making them recoverable. The eight RSA-4096 keys (G2B/G2C) were intact, but their private key material passed through the memory of a Python process on the ceremony host, so eMudhra says it can't show compliance with its CPS and revoked them on Nov 7. The four RSA G2C TLS and code-signing issuers had been issuing end-entity certificates since May 2026; eMudhra says those subscribers have been migrated. All issuance from the remaining emSign Root CA - G1 hierarchy will stop before Nov 16 as eMudhra exits public TLS.

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official (eMudhra full incident report on Mozilla Bugzilla 2083449, Nov 10, 2026)

2026-11-11 7:41 PM ET

### eMudhra's full incident report: one HSM-migration script broke 8 ECDSA keys and forced revocation of 8 RSA intermediates too; G1 issuance stops by Nov 16

- **Missed early warning:** the report ties a May-June 2025 CRL signature anomaly on the G3B/G3C intermediates (Bug 1970728) to the same defect; it was fixed at the signature level without finding the cause.
- **Also affected:** eight Sectigo (AAA Certificate Services) cross-certificates of the ECDSA set.
- **Check:** if you rely on code signed by or TLS certificates chaining to the EM G2C issuers, confirm you have replacements; the affected end-entity set can be rebuilt from Certificate Transparency by issuer.
- **Opinion, from Bugzilla discussion (not eMudhra):** commenters question why intermediate keys were exported at all rather than generated fresh on the new HSMs.

Sources: [eMudhra full incident report, Mozilla Bugzilla 2083449 comment 82 (Nov 10, 2026)](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2083449#c82) · [eMudhra: Certificate security incident page](https://emudhra.com/en/post/certificate-security-incident) · [BleepingComputer: eMudhra revokes 8 more CA certificates after private key mishap (Nov 11, 2026)](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/emudhra-revokes-8-more-ca-certificates-after-private-key-mishap/)