<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><rss version="2.0"><channel><title>ctxsec: Threat Hunting</title><link>https://ctxsec.com</link><description>context security: attacks on the harness and context layer of AI agents, plus exploited-now news, hunting and playbooks.</description><item><title>Hunt: SEO fake-PuTTY MSI → Node BYOI loader with EtherHiding C2</title><link>https://ctxsec.com/hunting#hunt-putty-etherhiding</link><guid>https://ctxsec.com/hunting#hunt-putty-etherhiding</guid><pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>hunt idea</category><description>Unit 42 (Oct 12 TTI): SEO-poisoned &quot;PuTTY&quot; downloads serve Putty-x86_64.msi that drops a signed PuTTY 0.85 decoy plus a Node.js bring-your-own-interpreter loader. C2 URL is resolved via Ethereum &lt;code&gt;eth_call&lt;/code&gt; (EtherHiding) and polled every 500 ms as fake static assets; operators push recon, cookie theft, and near-live screen streaming.&lt;pre&gt;// KQL sketch — AppData node + msiexec→curl Node zip
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ &quot;node.exe&quot; and FolderPath has @&quot;AppData\Local&quot;
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ &quot;msiexec.exe&quot;
| where FileName in~ (&quot;curl.exe&quot;,&quot;cmd.exe&quot;) and ProcessCommandLine has &quot;nodejs.org&quot;&lt;/pre&gt;Also watch eth_call from non-browser processes to public Ethereum RPCs. Sketch only; validate IOCs from Unit 42 before alerting.</description></item><item><title>Hunt: AhsayCBS / REDCap post-exploitation (webshell → miner)</title><link>https://ctxsec.com/hunting#hunt-ahsay</link><guid>https://ctxsec.com/hunting#hunt-ahsay</guid><pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>hunt idea</category><description>Both campaigns end in web-server-spawned shells and miners. Look for the web service process spawning cmd/powershell/sh, new script files in web roots, and outbound connections to mining pools.&lt;pre&gt;// KQL (Defender) sketch
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (&quot;java.exe&quot;,&quot;w3wp.exe&quot;,&quot;httpd&quot;,&quot;php-fpm&quot;)
| where FileName in~ (&quot;cmd.exe&quot;,&quot;powershell.exe&quot;,&quot;sh&quot;,&quot;bash&quot;)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine&lt;/pre&gt;Tune the parent list to your stack. Sketch only; validate before alerting.</description></item><item><title>Hunt: SonicWall SMA1000 SSRF abuse</title><link>https://ctxsec.com/hunting#hunt-sma</link><guid>https://ctxsec.com/hunting#hunt-sma</guid><pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>hunt idea</category><description>Review SMA1000 access logs for unauthenticated requests to unusual Work Place paths, and investigate unexpected connections from the appliance to internal services. Rotate credentials for anything reachable through the appliance&#x27;s trust context.</description></item></channel></rss>